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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 
Jeremy York Cunningham appeals from the second amended judgment and 
restitution order entered by the district court for possession of a controlled substance.  On 
appeal, Cunningham argues the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
documentary evidence during the restitution hearing.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury found Cunningham guilty of felony possession of a controlled substance.  
(42585 R., p. 83.1)  The state sought restitution for prosecution costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 37-2732(k).  (42585 10/23/14 Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – p. 5, L. 22; Ex. 1.)  In support of 
its restitution claim the state presented an unsworn statement of costs.  (42585 10/23/14 
Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – p. 5, L. 22; Ex. 1.)  The state also requested $100 in restitution under the 
Drug Donation Act for lab fees.  (42585 10/23/14 Tr., p. 5, L. 23 – p. 6, L. 4.)  The 
district court entered an amended judgment reflecting this restitution award.  (42585 R., 
p. 101.)  Cunningham timely appealed.  (42585 R., pp. 104-106.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that “the district court lacked any evidence to 
support its restitution award.”  State v. Cunningham, No. 42585, 2016 WL 800321, at *2 
(Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2016), aff'd, 161 Idaho 698, 390 P.3d 424 (2017).  The Court 
stated that “an unsworn written statement as to the amount of costs and hours spent 
                                                 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court ordered the record in this case be augmented to include the 
Clerk’s Record, Reporters’ Transcripts and Exhibits filed in prior appeal No. 42585, State 
v. Cunningham, Ada County No. CRFE-2014-5157.  (R., p. 2.)  Citations to documents 
and transcripts from the prior appeal will be identified as No. 42585. 
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prosecuting” was not evidence.  Id.  The Court of Appeals vacated the restitution award.  
Id.  The state sought, and the Supreme Court granted, review.  See State v. Cunningham, 
161 Idaho 698, 699, 390 P.3d 424, 425 (2017). 
On review, the Supreme Court analyzed the language of Idaho Code § 37-2732(k).  
Id. at 700-701, 390 P.3d at 426-427.  The Court then found that the unsworn one-
paragraph form submitted by the state was inadequate to support the district court’s 
restitution award.  Id. at 700, 390 P.3d at 426.  The one-paragraph form was a 
“boilerplate, fill-in-the-blank-style form” which only stated the total number of hours and 
rate and did not contain itemized time entries explaining the tasks performed.  Id.  Nor 
did the one-paragraph form certify its information as correct.  Id.   
The Statement of Costs merely identifies the defendant, the case number, 
and the prosecutor. It then states the total number of attorney hours, the 
hourly rate, and computes the sum total of the request. It does not contain 
itemized time entries explaining the tasks performed or the expenditures 
made in the particular case. Although it is signed, the signature does not 
purport to certify it as correct. 
 
Id.  The Court found that these “unsworn representations” did not constitute substantial 
evidence upon which restitution may be based.  Id. at 428, 390 P.3d at 702.  The Court 
noted, for future guidance, that Idaho Code § 37-2732(k), “by its plain terms, grants 
discretion to award restitution to the State for prosecution expenses ‘actually incurred.’”  
Id. (citing I.C. § 37-2732(k) (emphasis in original)).  Further, “[a]t a minimum, measuring 
up to section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove expenses actually incurred will generally 
require sworn statements that delineate the time spent performing specific tasks.”  Id.  
The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.  Id.   
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 On remand the district court held another restitution hearing.  (R., pp. 23-25.)  The 
state presented the testimony of Kylie Bolland, an administrative specialist with the Ada 
County Prosecutor’s Office, who handles accounts payable and is in charge of the 
certificate of records for drug prosecution.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 17 – p. 12, L. 1; Exs. 1-2.)  
Through Ms. Bolland’s testimony, the state admitted documents which itemized the time 
spent by each attorney on specific tasks in the case.  (Id.; Exs. 1-2.)  Ms. Bolland also 
testified that she determined, thorough payroll records, the amount it cost the county to 
pay the attorneys for the specified time.  (Id.)  Ms. Bolland testified that the total amount 
of prosecution costs was $906.75.  (Id.)  Cunningham did not cross-examine Ms. Bolland 
or present evidence.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 5-16.)   
The district court ruled the state provided substantial evidence and complied with 
the Idaho Supreme Court’s ruling in Cunningham.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 4 – p. 18, L. 14.) 
The district court held, in part:   
In this particular case, we have evidence by way of testimony, as 
well as by the written certificate of record, that the calculation is true and 
correct to the best of the information and belief.  It is sworn.  I do not find 
that the Supreme Court’s decision requires that it actually be sworn by an 
attorney.  Clearly, any custodian of records or competent witness can 
testify.  I do find that the person who reviews the records that were kept in 
the regular course of business, and these records indicate the amount of 
time and the type of effort that was expended by each attorney.  The 
testimony was that each one was an attorney.  That they were then billed 
on the actual payroll records of Ada County at the time that the expenses 
were actually incurred, so I do find that the evidence and testimony is 
sufficient to show that $906.75 of prosecution costs were actually incurred 
in this case.   
 
(7/7/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 15 – p. 17, L. 6.)  The district court ordered restitution in the amount 
of $1,006.75, which included the $906.75 in actual prosecution costs plus $100 for lab 
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costs.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-14; R., pp. 26-28, 33-35.)  Cunningham timely appealed.  







Cunningham states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court’s decision to award restitution after the Idaho 
Supreme Court remanded this case is still unsupported by the requisite 
substantial evidence. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 Has Cunningham failed to show the district court abused its discretion and applied 
incorrect legal standards when it admitted documentary evidence at the restitution hearing 
and based the restitution award on sworn testimony?  
















The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Awarded Restitution Pursuant 




The district court’s restitution order was based upon the sworn testimony of Ms. 
Bolland and the documents admitted into evidence.  (See 7/7/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 4 – p. 18, L. 
14; Exs. 1-2.)  Contrary to Cunningham’s argument on appeal, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it admitted the documents over Cunningham’s hearsay 
objections.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-17.)  Nor did the district court apply the 
incorrect legal standard when it awarded restitution to the state.  (See id.)   
The documents were properly admitted because hearsay is admissible in a 
restitution hearing.  See I.R.E. 101(d)(7); I.C. §§ 19-5304(6), 37-2732(k).  Even if the 
hearsay rules are applied, the district court properly admitted the documents pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6), the business records exception.  Further, the district court 
applied the correct legal standards when it awarded restitution pursuant to Idaho Code § 
37-2732(k) because that award was supported by sworn evidence delineating the tasks 
performed by each attorney and evidence, based upon payroll records, of the actual 
prosecution costs to the county.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the 
appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 
375 P.3d 279 (2016) (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 
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163–64, 45 P.3d 816, 819–20 (2002)).  To determine whether a trial court abused its 
discretion, the appellate court considers whether the trial court “correctly perceived the 
issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason.”  Id. (quoting Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 
51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Admitted Documents 
Into Evidence At The Restitution Hearing 
 
At the restitution hearing the state offered two documents, through Ms. Bolland’s 
testimony, which itemized the time spent by each attorney on specific tasks in the case.  
(7/7/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 17 – p. 12, L. 1; Exs. 1-2.)  The district court overruled 
Cunningham’s hearsay objection and admitted the two documents into evidence.  (See 
id.; Exs. 1-2.)  The district court properly admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 into evidence during 
the restitution hearing.  As an initial matter, the Idaho Rule of Evidence’s prohibitions on 
admitting hearsay do not apply in a restitution hearing.  See I.R.E. 101(d)(7); I.C. § 19-
5304(6).  Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(d)(7) states that the Idaho Rules of Evidence apply 
to restitution hearings, “except as modified by I.C. § 19-5304(6).”  I.R.E. 101(d)(7).  
Idaho Code § 19-5304(6), in turn, permits each party to present evidence relevant to 
restitution and the “court may consider such hearsay as may be contained in the 
presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided to the court.”  I.C. § 
19-5304(6).  Thus, pursuant to the plain language of Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(d)(7) 
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and Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) the court may consider such hearsay as “otherwise provided 
to the court” during a restitution hearing.   
Cunningham argues, in a footnote, that the provision of Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) 
that allows the consideration of hearsay in restitution proceedings does not extend to 
restitution sought under Idaho Code § 37-2732(k).  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8, n. 3.)  
Specifically, Cunningham claims that no Idaho Court has applied the § 19-5304(6) 
exception in a hearing under § 37-2732(k) and claims that, to do so, would contravene the 
holding of Cunningham and the plain language of I.C. § 37-2732(k).  (See id. (citing 
Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702, 390 P.3d at 426).)  Cunningham also argues the state did 
not argue the applicability of I.C. § 19-5304(6) below.  (See id.)  Cunningham’s 
arguments fail.   
First, the provision of Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) that allows the consideration of 
hearsay in restitution proceedings applies to restitution sought under Idaho Code § 37-
2732(k).  Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(d)(7) sets forth the evidentiary rules that apply in 
restitution hearings.   
(d) Rules Inapplicable in Part. These rules apply in the following 
proceedings subject to the enumerated exceptions: 
 
(7) Restitution hearings. Restitution hearings except as modified 
by I.C. § 19-5304(6). 
 
I.R.E. 101(d)(7).  Hearings pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) are restitution hearings 
because the plain language of Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) states that upon certain 
convictions “the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement 
agencies in investigating the violation.”  I.C. § 37-2732(k) (emphasis added).  Thus 
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hearings pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) are restitution hearings.  As a result, Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 101(d)(7) governs restitution proceedings under Idaho Code § 37-
2732(k).  Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(d)(7) applies the Idaho Rules of Evidence to 
restitution hearings, except as modified by Idaho Code § 19-5304(6).  And as explained 
above, Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) permits a court to consider hearsay evidence when 
deciding restitution.  Therefore, the provision of Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) that allows the 
consideration of hearsay in restitution proceedings applies to restitution sought under 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(k).   
While Idaho’s appellate courts have not expressly ruled on the applicability of 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) to restitution proceedings under I.C. § 37-2732(k), the Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-5304 can be instructive 
when awarding restitution under § 37-2732(k).  See State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 692, 
390 P.3d 412, 418 (2017).  Specifically, the Court held that courts ordering restitution 
under Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) may consider the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 19-
5304(7) to determine whether restitution is appropriate under the circumstances of the 
case.  See id.; see also Cunningham, 161 Idaho 702, 390 P.3d at 428.  There is no rational 
reason to apply Idaho Code § 19-5304(7) to restitution proceedings under § 37-2732(k), 
but to exclude from consideration the provisions of I.C. § 19-5304(6).   
Nor does the holding of Cunningham compel the conclusion that the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) are not applicable in restitution proceedings under Idaho Code § 
37-2732(k).  Cunningham implicitly acknowledges that hearsay should be admitted in § 
37-2732(k) restitution hearings.  See Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702, 390 P.3d at 426.  In 
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Cunningham, the Court held that a district court deciding whether to award restitution 
under § 37-2732(k), may consider the factors set forth in § 19-5304(7).  Id.  The § 19-
5304(7) factors include “the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the 
defendant.”  I.C. § 19-5304(7).  The district court should also consider “fines imposed, 
victim restitution, assets, and previous and prospective earning abilities.”  Cunningham, 
161 Idaho at 702, 390 P.3d at 428.  It is difficult to imagine that the Cunningham court 
intended its ruling to require defendants to introduce all this broad financial evidence 
through non-hearsay methods.  There is no rational basis to find that some of provisions 
of Idaho Code § 19-5304 are applicable to restitution hearings under § 37-2732(k) and 
others are not.   
The Idaho Supreme Court also clarified that the holding in Cunningham is 
limited.  State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 923, 393 P.3d 576, 583 (2017).  Cunningham 
only stands for the proposition that to prove expenses actually incurred during 
prosecution, the state has to introduce “sworn statements that delineate the time spent 
performing specific tasks.”  See id. 
We acknowledge our recent cases of State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 
390 P.3d 424, 428 (2017), and State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 390 P.3d 
418, 423 (2017), where we held that unsworn representations did not 
“constitute ‘substantial evidence’ upon which restitution under [Idaho 
Code] section 37-2732(k) may be based.” Critical to our holdings in 
Cunningham and Nelson was the fact that section 37-2732(k) only permits 
restitution to be awarded for prosecution expenses “actually incurred.” 
We were careful to limit our holdings in Cunningham and Nelson by 
hewing close to that statutory mandate, instructing that “measuring up to 
section 37-2732(k)'s burden to prove expenses actually incurred will 
generally require sworn statements that delineate the time spent 
performing specific tasks.” Cunningham, 390 P.3d at 428; Nelson, 390 
P.3d at 423. Thus, Cunningham and Nelson are limited to restitution under 
section 37-2732(k), and no analogy can be advanced to this case. Indeed, 
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the causation inquiry at issue in this case is plainly not susceptible to a 
sworn accounting ledger. 
 
Id.  Here the state complied with Cunningham.  The state introduced sworn testimony 
regarding the expenses actually incurred in prosecuting the case and delineating the tasks 
performed.  (See 7/7/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 17 – p. 12, L. 1; Exs. 1-2.)  Nothing in Cunningham, 
or cases interpreting it, compels the conclusion that the provisions of Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 101(d)(7) and Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) do not apply to § 37-2732(k) restitution 
hearings.   
 Finally, Cunningham asserts that the state did not argue to the district court that 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) applied when the state was responding to Cunningham’s 
hearsay objections.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8, n. 3 (citing generally R., Tr.).)  Cunningham 
does not argue that the state should be precluded on appeal from making the argument 
that § 19-5304(6) applies.  (See id.)  Nor does Cunningham argue the state somehow 
waived this argument or that this Court is precluded from addressing this argument on 
appeal.  (See id.)  Since Cunningham has not supported any waiver assertion with law or 
argument, any such implied assertion should not be considered on appeal.  See State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered.”).   
Regardless, the issue of whether Exhibits 1 and 2 should be admitted into 
evidence was raised below.  (See 7/7/17 Tr., p. 6, L. 8 – p. 7, L. 22, p. 9, L. 23 – p. 11, L. 
2; Ex. 1, 2.)  The only point that was not explicitly discussed below was whether Idaho 
Code § 19-5304(6) applied to the restitution hearing.  (See id.)  Even if this Court 
considers a waiver argument (which Cunningham never actually made), this Court can 
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still find that the district court reached the correct result when it admitted the documents, 
albeit by way of alternative legal reasoning.  See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 
271, 275-276, 396 P.3d 700, 704–705 (2017).  The correct law is that the hearsay rules 
are inapplicable in restitution hearings pursuant to the plain language of Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 101(d)(7) and Idaho Code § 19-5304(6).  Exhibits 1 and 2 were properly 
admitted during the restitution hearing over Cunningham’s hearsay objections.   
 
1. Even If The Hearsay Rules Apply In A Restitution Hearing, The District 
Court Properly Admitted Exhibits 1 And 2 Pursuant To I.R.E. 803(6) – 
The Business Records Exception 
 
The hearsay rules do not apply in a restitution hearing.  See I.R.E. 101(d)(7); I. C. 
§§ 19-5304(6), 37-2732(k).  However, even if they do apply, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 under the business records 
exception, I.R.E. 803(6).  
Ms. Bolland, an administrative specialist who handles accounts payable and the 
certificate of records for drug prosecution, testified.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 17 – p. 12, L. 1.)  
She determined, based upon payroll records, what it cost the county to pay the attorneys 
for the time spent prosecuting the case.  (Id.)  
Q. When you are doing the certificates of records for drug 
prosecution, what’s your process? 
 
A. So I will get the file either from the attorney or when a sentencing 
hearing’s set, and open up the file, and, then, there is a purple worksheet 
where attorneys initial their time and date on their time they spent on the 
case, so I go through and write down all the attorneys, the dates they 
worked and the time, and then, I have access to payroll records dating back 




 So I’ll determine the date the attorney worked.  Look back to when 
they were actually paid for that date and then go through the payroll 
records and determine an hourly wage based off what they were paid for 
that month, and, then multiply by the time that they worked, to get what 
that chunk of time would have cost the county, to pay restitution.  
 
(7/7/17 Tr., p. 4, L. 10 – p. 5, L. 2.)  Ms. Bolland testified that the “purple sheet” keeps 
track of the time that attorneys spent on a particular case. (7/7/17 Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – p. 7, L. 
22; Ex. 1.)  The “purple sheet” is kept in the ordinary course of business of the Ada 
County Prosecutor’s Office.  (Id.)  
Cunningham objected to the admission of the “purple sheet” on the grounds that 
Ms. Bolland did not have personal knowledge that the numbers on the “purple sheet” 
were accurate.  (Id.)  The state responded by arguing that the “purple sheet” is the method 
the office uses to keep records in these matters and that Ms. Bolland uses the numbers on 
these documents in her ordinary course of business.  (Id.)  After Ms. Bolland testified to 
that effect, the district court ruled there was sufficient foundation to admit the documents 
under the business records exception, I.R.E. 803(6).  (Id.) 
THE COURT:  Under Rule 803, the exception to hearsay, section 
6, Records of Regular Conduct Activity, the availability of the declarant is 
immaterial if it’s regularly kept in the course of business.   
 
I do find there is sufficient foundation based on the testimony.  I 
will allow the admission of Exhibit 1.  
 
(7/7/17 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 14-21.)  Ms. Bolland testified how long and what tasks each attorney 
performed on the case.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 25 – p. 9, L. 1.)   
Ms. Bolland then testified that she compiled Exhibit 2, the certificate of records 
affidavit, and that it was accurate, signed and notarized.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 9, L. 2 – p. 11, L. 
10; Ex. 2.)  Cunningham objected on the same grounds as Exhibit 1, that Ms. Bolland did 
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not have personal knowledge of the numbers on the document.  (Id.)  The district court 
examined Exhibit 2, the testimony of Ms. Bolland and the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Cunningham, and overruled the objection.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 10, L. 5 – p. 11, L. 9.)  The 
district court ruled that Ms. Bollard was qualified as a witness to testify regarding the 
records.  (Id.)   
THE COURT:  Can I see Exhibit 2? 
 
This certificate does indicate that Ms. Bolland was first duly sworn 
deposed and says – and says at the end – “the foregoing to the best of her 
information and belief.”  So I do find the certificate to be sworn, which 
was the requirement of the Supreme Court’s decision, so with it being 
sworn, it’s not hearsay.  I understand your objection is the underlying 
information, so, essentially, this is actually a summary. 
 
Can I see Exhibit 2 again.  Given that Ms. Bolland is here 
testifying, this certificate of records is not a self-authenticating certified 
record of a regularly conducted activity under 901, section 11.  While she 
certifies that the payroll records are kept in the regular course of business, 
she does not certify that she is the custodian.  While she states that she’s 
aware that the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney keeps records, again, she 
does not state that she’s the custodian kept in the regular course of 
business, so I’m not admitting it as a self-authenticating certified record.  
 
However, Ms. Bolland is here actually testifying, and since she is 
here testifying under 803(6), the records of regularly conducted activity 
does not require the testimony to be given by the custodian of the records.  
The record [sic] actually allows testimony of a custodian or other qualified 
witness.  To the extent she is a qualified witness as to her knowledge and 
interaction of those records, I will permit the admission of Exhibit 2. 
 
(7/7/17 Tr., p. 10, L. 5 – p. 11, L. 9; Ex. 2.)  Ms. Bolland then testified that the total 
amount of restitution requested for prosecution costs was $906. 75.  (7/17/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 
19 – p. 12, L. 1.)  Cunningham did not cross-examine Ms. Bolland or present evidence.  
(7/7/17 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 5-16.)  After argument by the parties, the district court found the 
state presented substantial evidence of actual prosecution costs and awarded restitution in 
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the amount of $906.75, plus $100 for lab costs that was not challenged.  (See 7/7/17 Tr., 
p. 16, L. 4 – p. 18, L. 14.) 
On appeal, Cunningham argues that the district court abused its discretion when it 
admitted the “purple sheet” (Ex. 1) and the affidavit (Ex. 2) under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.)  Cunningham does not 
argue that the state failed to meet the requirements of the business records exception.  
(See id.)  Instead, Cunningham argues that the business records exception could not be 
utilized by the state.  Cunningham argues that “the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear 
that the business records exception does not apply to documents which were prepared by 
a public office or agency in anticipation of litigation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (citing 
State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 911-912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1058-1059 (2003).)  
Sandoval-Tena is inapplicable because neither of the exhibits in this case are 
“investigative reports,” nor were the documents admitted in trial.   
The state charged Sandoval-Tena with one count of trafficking in 
methamphetamine by possessing more than 28 grams.  Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho at 910, 
71 P.3d at 1057.  At trial the state called a state lab forensic technician.  Id.  The district 
court allowed the admission of the lab report.  Id.  The forensic technician testified that 
the substance found was methamphetamine, but failed to testify as to the weight of the 
methamphetamine.  Id.  However, the weight of the methamphetamine was contained on 
the admitted lab report.  Id.  The district court permitted the state to recall the forensic 
technician, who testified as to the weight of the methamphetamine.  Id. at 910-911, 71 
P.3d at 1057-1058.  On appeal, Sandoval-Tena argued, in part, the district court erred 
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when it admitted the lab report as an exhibit, contending the report was inadmissible 
hearsay.  Id. at 1058, 71 P.3d at 1058.  The Idaho Supreme Court analyzed two exceptions 
to the hearsay rule: Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6), the “business records exception,” and 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8), the “public records exception.”  Id.  Under the “business 
records exception,” reports, records, or data compilations made in the regular course of 
business, as shown by a qualified witness, may be admitted into evidence.  See I.R.E. 
803(6).  The “public records exception,” allows reports, records, or data compilations that 
sets forth its regularly conducted activities may be admitted into evidence.  See I.R.E. 
803(8).  However, the “public records exception” does not extend to certain investigative 
reports.  See id.  Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8), states in part:  
The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: (A) 
investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel, 
except when offered by an accused in a criminal case; (B) investigative 
reports prepared by or for a government, a public office or an agency when 
offered by it In a case in which it is a party; (C) factual findings offered by 
the government in criminal cases; (D) factual findings resulting from 
special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident, except 
when offered by an accused in a criminal case. 
 
I.R.E. 803(8).  The Idaho Supreme Court relied on United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 
68 (2nd Cir. 1977), in which a similar lab report was held inadmissible under a similar 
public records exception.  Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho at 912, 71 P.3d at 1059.  In Oates, 
the court held that the lab reports were made for the specific purposes of convicting the 
defendant.   See Oates, 560 F.2d at 68.  The holding in Sandoval-Tena, which relied upon 
Oates extended the “investigative report” limitation in I.R.E. 803(8) to I.R.E. 803(6) in 
the context of a jury trial with the goal of convicting the defendant.  Here, there is no 
plausible interpretation that an itemized list of attorney tasks and costs is an 
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“investigative report.”  Nor do the same protections at trial apply at a restitution hearing.  
The holding in Sandoval-Tena does not eliminate the applicability of the business records 
exception for the state in a restitution hearing.   
Because the business records exception was available to the state in the restitution 
hearing, Cunningham has failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
overruled his hearsay objection and admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 pursuant to the business 
records exception.   
 
D. The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard When It Awarded 
Restitution Pursuant To Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded restitution.  
Contrary to Cunningham’s argument on appeal, the district court applied the correct legal 
standard when it awarded restitution.  The district court ruled that the state presented 
substantial and competent evidence to support the restitution award.   
THE COURT:  The restitution award under section 37-2732(k) 
must be based on a preponderance of the evidence, and the award of 
restitution will not be disturbed if it’s supported by substantial evidence.  
Whether an award of restitution under that statute is within the discretion 
of the court in the previous statement, the Supreme Court found fault in 
that, and it did not itemize time entry, explaining the task performed or 
expenditures made in a particular case.  Although, it was signed, the 
signature did not comport to certify that it is correct.  
 
In this particular case, we have evidence by way of testimony, as 
well as by the written certificate of record, that the calculation is true and 
correct to the best of the information and belief.  It is sworn.  I do not find 
that the Supreme Court’s decision requires that it actually be sworn by an 
attorney.  Clearly, any custodian of records or competent witness can 
testify.  I do find that the person who reviews the records that were kept in 
the regular course of business, and these records indicate the amount of 
time and the type of effort that was expended by each attorney.  The 
testimony was that each one was an attorney.  That they were then billed 
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on the actual payroll records of Ada County at the time that the expenses 
were actually incurred, so I do find that the evidence and testimony is 
sufficient to show that $906.75 of prosecution costs were actually incurred 
in this case.   
 
As to the policy argument about whether drug costs for prosecution 
should be assessed, that’s an argument for the legislature.  I do not find it 
to be unconstitutional.  Court costs are routinely ordered in every case.  
It’s just this particular type of case, the legislature has allowed a different 
compensation scheme for law-enforcement agencies to recover costs, so I 
don’t find that it’s a valid due process argument, and so if there’s an 
argument that it should not be assessed, that’s really an argument for the 
legislature.  
 
I understand it is within the discretion of the court.  I do find that 
the cost now verified are now reasonable, and I do find that since Mr. 
Cunningham is on parole, he is eligible and able to pay those.  Quite 
frankly, even when he was incarcerated with an original order, with the 
original order even at that time, restitution is not based on one’s immediate 
ability to pay restitution but eventual ability to pay restitution.   
 
As to the delay in time, the delay in time is actually caused by the 
appeal and the remand, and that delay of time in receiving the Supreme 
Court’s decision does not make a restitution order any less reasonable at 
this time since this is the time of the hearing, for the remand.  So to that 
extent, I do find there’s substantial and competent evidence to show that 
there are $906.75 in prosecution costs.  
 
As to the $100 in lab costs that was previously ordered, that was 
not the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision vacating and remanding, 
so that portion was not appealed, so that will be $100 for the lab costs that 
were supported by the lab reports in the presentence investigation, so that 
makes a total order restitution $1,006.75. 
 
(7/7/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 4 – p. 18, L. 14.) 
 
Cunningham argues the district court applied the incorrect legal standard, 
contending the documents and testimony presented by the state at the restitution hearing 
did not comply with the ruling in Cunningham because, he claims, the evidence was 
“unsworn.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.)  Cunningham argues that the evidence was 
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“unsworn” because the individual attorneys who performed the tasks itemized on Exhibit 
1 (the “purple sheet”) did not submit their time sheets as sworn affidavits.  (See id.) 
“Basically, the district court ordered restitution based only on Ms. Bolland’s testimony 
that she accurately took the unverified numbers from the purple sheet, applied a number 
from the payroll records which she did not provide to the district court, and calculated a 
sum total.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (citation omitted).)  Cunningham’s argument is 
based upon a misunderstanding of how hearsay and evidence operates.   
There is no requirement, or even expectation, that documents admitted under the 
business records exception have to be sworn at every level.  Idaho Rule of Evidence 
801(c) defines hearsay as: 
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
 
I.R.E. 801.  Generally hearsay is not admissible, except as provided by the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence or other rule.  See I.R.E. 802.  One of the ways hearsay can be admissible is 
through the business records exception, which allows reports or data, if kept in the course 
of regularly conducted business activity, to be admissible if “shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or other qualified witness.”  See I.R.E. 803(6).   
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness. 
 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
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qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), 
unless the opponent shows the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 
“business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or 
not conducted for profit. 
 
I.R.E. 803(6).   
Thus, the business records exception explicitly contemplates documents kept in 
the ordinary course of business will be admissible if testified to by a qualified witness.  
Documents kept in the ordinary course of business are not sworn.  The regular course of 
business does not include stamping all documents and data with notary seals.  The rule 
provides that so long as the qualified witness testifies that the documents at issue were 
kept in the regular course of business the underlying unsworn documents are admissible.   
Here, Ms. Bolland was a qualified witness and she gave sworn testimony that 
Exhibit 1 was kept within the ordinary course of business, thus satisfying the foundational 
requirements of I.R.E. 803(6).  (See 7/7/17 Tr., p. 4, L. 2 – p. 7, L. 22; Ex. 1.)  
Cunningham’s argument that the underlying documents need to be sworn, in addition to 
Ms. Bolland’s sworn testimony, is without merit.   
 The district court’s ruling complies with Cunningham.  Cunningham held that a 
one-paragraph form was inadequate because it was a “boilerplate, fill-in-the-blank-style 
form” which only stated the total number of hours and rate and did not contain itemized 
time entries explaining the tasks performed.  Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700, 390 P.3d at 
426.  Nor was the form sworn as correct.  Id.  The Court noted, for future guidance, that 
“[a]t a minimum, measuring up to section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove expenses actually 
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incurred will generally require sworn statements that delineate the time spent performing 
specific tasks.”  Id.   
 That is what happened here.  Ms. Bolland swore that Exhibit 1, which delineated 
the time spent by attorneys in this case, was kept in the ordinary course of business and 
was used by her to complete a sworn certificate.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – p. 9, L. 1.; Ex. 
1.)  The Cunningham decision does not change the rules of evidence or requirements 
regarding the admission of evidence.  Cunningham clarified that the “burden to prove 
expenses actually incurred will generally require sworn statements that delineate the time 
spent performing specific tasks.”  Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 923, 393 P.3d at 583.  Here, 
Exhibit 1, which was admitted into evidence via sworn testimony, delineated the time 
spent by attorneys performing specific tasks.  (See Ex. 1.)  Further, Ms. Bolland testified 
regarding these specific tasks.  (7/7/17 Tr. p. 7, L. 25 – p. 8, L. 23.)  Cunningham held 
that the documents admitted in a restitution hearing had to be sworn into evidence – just 
like any other restitution hearing.  There is no additional evidentiary requirement imposed 
by Cunningham.   
The state also complied with the holding in Cunningham by having Ms. Bolland 
testify, under oath, and submit an affidavit detailing the amount of time spent and how 
much the prosecution cost the county.  (See 7/7/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 25 – p. 12, L. 1; Exs. 1-2.)  
Ms. Bolland swore that the attorney information was “true and correct to the best of [her] 
information and belief.”  (See Ex. 2.) 
3. I have reviewed the time log in this case, which documents the 
prosecutor time spent prosecuting the above reference drug case.  Erin 
Pittenger spent a total of .2 hours working on this case, Heather Reilly 
spent .1 hours working on this case, Kale Gans spent .7 hours working on 
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this case, James Vogt spent 3.5 hours working on this case, and Barbara 
Duggan spent 11.5 hours working on this case.  I’ve applied the 
appropriate payroll rate for said attorneys and calculated the aggregate 




5. The foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information and 
belief.  
 
(Ex. 2.)  The district court’s restitution award was based upon substantial and competent 
evidence.   
 Further, as a practical and public policy matter, it makes far more sense to have 
the person in charge of payroll provide testimony regarding the restitution costs than 
requiring attorneys to provide testimony regarding what actual costs were incurred by the 
county.  Regardless of any public policy considerations, the state complied with the 
holding in Cunningham and provided evidence, both in the form of live sworn testimony 
and a sworn affidavit, regarding the actual cost incurred by the state in prosecuting this 
case.  The district court applied the correct legal standard when it awarded restitution.   
 
E. The State Introduced Sworn Testimony Regarding The Actual Costs Incurred By 
The County 
 
 The state provided sworn testimony that the restitution award was based upon the 
payroll records of Ada County.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 4, L. 10 – p. 5, L. 2; Ex. 2.)  On appeal, 
Cunningham argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s 
restitution finding because the state did not introduce payroll documentation for the 
prosecutors’ individual pay rates.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)  Cunningham 
claims that Ms. Bolland’s sworn testimony is insufficient to support the district court’s 
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finding.  (See id.)  Cunningham argues that Ms. Bolland’s testimony fails to show “how 
that data is actually related to the losses claimed.”  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (citing 
State v. Hurles, 158 Idaho 569, 577, 349 P.3d 423, 431 (2015).)  Cunningham’s argument 
on appeal fails.   
Ms. Bolland testified that she looked back to what each attorney was actually paid 
to determine the attorney’s hourly wage and then she multiplied that hourly wage by the 
time spent working on the case.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 4, L. 10 – p. 5, L. 2; Ex. 2.)  Based upon 
this she was able to determine how much it cost the county to prosecute the case.  (See 
id.)  She testified that she calculated, based upon payroll records, that the total amount of 
prosecution costs was $906.75 for the time spent prosecuting this case.  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 4, 
L. 10 – p. 12, L. 1; Ex. 2.)  This evidence was admitted by the district court.  (See id.)   
Here, unlike in Hurles, the losses incurred were directly identified and testified to 
by Ms. Bolland.  Ms. Bolland testified that she went through the payroll records for each 
individual attorney and determined their rates of pay for the dates they worked.  (7/7/17 
Tr., p. 4, L. 10 – p. 5, L. 12.)  She swore the “actual prosecution cost to be a total of 
$906.75.”  (7/7/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 19 – p. 12, L. 1; Ex. 2.)   
On appeal Cunningham appears to argue that additional foundation was required 
to admit this testimony, such as more payroll information.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-
16.)  This is incorrect.  As explained above, Ms. Bolland was familiar with the payroll 
records that were kept in the ordinary course of business and testified as to the amount of 
prosecution costs.  If Cunningham wanted additional information from Ms. Bolland it 
was incumbent upon him to cross-examine Ms. Bolland and question that underlying 
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documentation or her calculation.  However, Cunningham declined to do so.  (See 7/7/17 
Tr., p. 12, Ls. 5-16.)  The state presented the sworn testimony of someone who knew the 
payroll records and testified as to how much the county paid for prosecution costs.  This 
is what is required by the holding in Cunningham, the plain language of Idaho Code § 37-
2732(k) and the Idaho Rules of Evidence.  Cunningham’s attempt to impose additional 
requirements on the sworn testimony should be rejected.  The district court had 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the second amended judgment 
and amended restitution order of the district court.   
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